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A compensation-based pricing scheme is a market clearing mechanism that may be applied when
a uniform, linear pricing scheme cannot support equilibrium allocations in the auction markets. We
analyze extensions of our previously proposed pricing scheme [14] to include various possible repre-
sentations of bids that reflect some non-convex costs and constraints. We conclude with a discussion
on directions for future research.
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1. Introduction
In electricity markets organized as centralized multi-period pool auctions, or power
exchange markets, usually there exist non-convexities incorporated through bids, re-
flecting the operational characteristics of thermal generating units. Such auctions may
ensure the feasibility of system operation, together with efficient energy production
and maximization of social welfare. However, some difficulties may arise when pric-
ing issues are investigated.
It is now widely recognized that fair market clearing based on non-convex bids
cannot be performed using a uniform linear pricing scheme, as the outcomes may be
far from optimal for the market participants [2]–[9], [14]. Therefore, in the literature
given above, a variety of market-based mechanisms have been proposed to establish
appropriate pricing rules that support efficient, centrally imposed schedules. These
pricing rules lead to nonlinear prices, which means that trade is cleared based
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mainly on uniform hourly prices. However, some participants (suppliers usually)
also receive side payments, or compensation for their profit losses compared to
market prices. Such compensation somehow reduces the incongruity between the
goals of the market operator and those of self-interested, profit-seeking individual
market participants. A discussion of different approaches addressing nonlinear
pricing can be found in [14].
In a previous article [14] we proposed a novel pricing scheme for multi-period
pool auctions. This scheme, formulated as a MILP optimization problem, enables the
determination of uniform market prices minimizing the costs of compensation paid to
the market participants (both suppliers and/or customers), who could claim inefficien-
cies compared to operating under market-clearing prices only. Thanks to such com-
pensation, this method allows each generator and consumer to obtain their maximum
profits, while realizing centrally imposed schedules under market prices. In [14]
a simplified formulation of such a pricing model was addressed.
In this paper we analyze several applications of an MILP compensation-based
pricing scheme for alternative representations of bids, including non-convex costs and
constraints, such as start-up, shut-down and fixed costs, minimum-run times and run
levels, as well as block bids (“fill or kill”). This allows us to extend the mathematical
model for auction pricing provided in [14], so that it is suitable for a broad range of
markets with non-convexities. The resulting general optimization model analyzed in
this paper can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming model. However,
as in the case of power exchange with block-bids only linear variables and constraints
may be used.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we review the compensation-
based pricing scheme developed in [14] and discuss the desired properties of non-
convex auction pricing. Then, the compensation model is analyzed, followed by
a formal representation of different types of non-convex bids. In section 5 we explain
how our pricing model can be applied to power exchange with block bids. Finally, we
discuss future research in section 6.
2. Properties of a compensation-based pricing scheme
Setting fair market energy prices in auctions with non-convexities is a very chal-
lenging problem. There are a number of alternative approaches for pricing in multi-
period auctions. However, most research effort has been devoted to designing methods
of providing compensation to market participants that is separate from market-clearing
price payments [2], [3], [5], [6], [8], [14]. The general idea is to share social costs
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participants. The aim is to treat all the market participants fairly and provide the mar-
ket operator with more degrees of freedom to appropriately control the strategies of
the market participants.
In this paper we refer to [14], where a compensation-based approach for setting
fair prices in multi-period pool-based auctions with price-responsive (elastic) demand
was developed. The method is based on considering two vectors of competitive market
clearing selling prices π
S and purchase prices π
B for energy. The hourly sale and pur-
chase prices are differentiated to share the (nonnegative) costs of the necessary com-
pensation R paid to participants who incur costs due to the necessity of satisfying the
network constraints. Such a scheme can be applied as a separate pricing step of the
market clearing procedure, after the operational schedules have been determined.
The general idea is shown in Fig. 1: generators and buyers submit sale and pur-
chase bids to the market operator. The market operator solves an optimization
problem that defines the power production schedules of the bidding generators and
load schedules of the consumers, so that all the bid-based constraints of the partici-
pants are satisfied and the energy balance of demand and supply is accomplished in
each period of the scheduling horizon. The main goal of the operator may be to
maximize social welfare, which may be defined as the sum of consumer and pro-
ducer surpluses over all periods of time. Next, the social welfare obtained is distrib-
uted between those market participants who submitted competitive bids, based on
clearing prices and compensation. The clearing prices are used as the basis for pay-
ments from buyers and to sellers, while compensation is paid to some market par-
ticipants to avoid individual profit-optimality losses faced under the clearing prices
due to the non-convexities existing in the market. As mentioned before, the hourly
purchase and sale energy prices, as well as minimum levels of possible compensa-
tion, are computed using an MILP model.
This MILP compensation-based pricing approach has several important properties
that should be satisfied to set efficient prices in auctions with non-convexities.
1) All payments should be based on nondiscriminatory uniform linear prices due to
the attractive qualities of such a scheme (clarity and transparency among others). If
this is not possible, then some additional non-uniform price based payments (i.e. com-
pensation) should be introduced. It is important that uniform prices should be set at
a level that produces the minimum level of compensation based payments. This aspect
is well understood by most authors dealing with nonlinear pricing. However, due to
the complexity of such problems, only procedures that approximate such a solution are
known, see [3] and [6]. Using an MILP compensation-based pricing scheme, the
minimum possible level of compensation costs R is obtained, through the minimiza-
tion of the differences between the purchase and selling prices:
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where Dh is the total amount of energy consumed and produced in hour h. In the case
of clearing a market with linear costs and constraints (without non-convexities), the
optimal solution of the pricing model gives R = 0 and the clearing prices are the same
for buyers and sellers, i.e. π
S = π
B [13].
Fig. 1. A pool-based market balancing process under the considered pricing scheme:
first efficient schedules are determined, then the prices with compensation
2) The pricing mechanism should be financially neutral, that is all costs must be
recovered by charges. This requirement is accomplished in our pricing model using
a financial neutrality constraint, requiring that the payments from buyers based on
clearing purchase prices minus compensation paid to buyers must be equal to the
payments to sellers based on clearing selling prices plus compensation paid to sellers.
Some articles, such as [9], do not specify how the non-energy based payments should
be collected – the tacit assumption is that the costs of non-linear price payments are
charged entirely to consumers by increasing consumer tariffs. Such rules favour the
supply side at the expense of the demand side.
3) All market participants must be treated without discrimination, that is to say that
no agent would accept losses in profits based on market prices and bids. This is
a controversial point, as most authors use confiscatory non-linear prices that allow
reducing the price-based payment a supplier should receive [3], [4], [7]–[9]. We state
that all agents should obtain their maximum profits by realizing the operational sched-
ule, as this is the only way to reduce the incongruence between individual goals and
the operator’s goals. In a market environment, profits can never be too high from the
point of view of a firm. This condition is also raised in [2], [5], [6].A compensation-based pricing scheme in markets with non-convexities 129
Concluding this section, the considered MILP pricing scheme satisfies various
properties desirable to the operator of a non-convex market. Furthermore, it can be
stated as an optimization problem, with (1) as the (minimized) objective function and
the following constraints:
•  the financial neutrality constraint ensuring that consumer payments based on
purchase prices balance the price based generator payments and compensation costs,
• hourly purchase and selling price constraints (π
B > = π
S) ensuring that purchase
prices are not less than selling prices in any hour,
• auxiliary nonnegative deficit and surplus price constraints determined for every
hourly offer,
• price-dependent compensation constraints linking compensation payments to en-
ergy prices, on the basis of the optimal and actual profits made by each of the partici-
pants, determined for each participant at any time,
• price-dependent optimal hourly profits determination made by each of the gen-
erator, defined on the basis of submitted offers for each generator at each hour.
For details of the complete MILP optimization model, the interested reader is re-
ferred to [14]. The last two groups of constraints are analyzed more closely in the next
two sections, showing the possibility of adapting them to a wide range of auctions
with non-convexities.
3. Compensation and maximum profit constraints
The compensation-based pricing mechanism under consideration was designed to
set hourly linear sale and purchase prices, which may be differentiated to share the
(nonnegative) costs of compensation paid to participants who lose due to the need to
satisfy the network constraints. The aim is to offset financial losses or foregone op-
portunities for profit, providing profit optimality to all market participants. The com-
pensation paid in addition to the market price-based payments make operational
schedules profit maximizing for all consumers and generating units.
A consumer’s profits may be defined as the difference between the bid-based bene-
fit function of demand and the price-based payments. Similarly, a generating unit's
profits may be defined as the difference between the price-based payments and the
bid-based cost function of supply. Henceforth, we will only refer to generating units,
since the analysis of the demand side is straightforward as the purchase bids do not
incorporate any nonlinear constraints or characteristics. Under uniform linear energy
prices, a generator’s hourly revenue (profit) φ can be formally calculated based on the
market clearing price π, amount of energy p to be purchased and the linear, bid-based
cost C(p) for producing:I. ŻÓŁTOWSKA, E. TOCZYŁOWSKI 130
) (p C πp = − φ .( 2 )
Given the price π, a generator should choose the optimal level of utilization maxi-
mizing the profit function (2). When the optimal level of utilization, denoted here by
p ˆ , yields less profit than the operational level p* determined by the market operator,
then there is a need for hourly compensation R supporting the economic utilization
solution:
) *, ( ) , ˆ ( π p π p = R φ φ − . (3)
Notice that the price dependent function  ) , ˆ ( π p φ  is equivalent to the dual function
of the bid-based costs C(p). This dual function P(π) defines a generator's optimal
profit function dependent on price [11]. In Fig. 2 we give an example hourly profit
function that is the dual: a) to a stepwise monotonically increasing bid curve; b) to
a piecewise, linear bid curve.
Fig. 2. Optimal profit determination for a given price π ˆ  and cost function C(p) resulting from:
(a) piecewise linear bid; (b) stepwise bid. The optimal profit function P(π) is the dual function to C(p)
and has the same, piecewise linear form in both cases
Generally, for any well-behaved, continuous function of bid-based costs C(p), it is
easy to derive its dual function P(π) [11] that describes the linear dependencies be-
tween a generator’s optimal profit and the energy price. Then (3) can be presented as:
) *, ( ) ( π p π P = R φ − (4)
and the prices and compensation payments can be computed using a simple LP com-
pensation minimizing model [13]. The hourly compensation R paid to the agent in
a given hour naturally augments its revenue function to guarantee the optimal profit
maximizing level of utilization for this agent. We obtain
) ( ) *, (
~
π P = R + π p =φ φ .( 5 )
In a more general case, decision models require not only continuous supply vari-
ables p, but also binary commitment variables v. This happens when generators areA compensation-based pricing scheme in markets with non-convexities 131
allowed to specify non-convex, bid-based costs S(v) connected with commitment vari-
ables. Bid-based commitment costs may include fixed costs, as well as start-up and
shut-down costs [5], [9]. In such a case, the total revenue is the sum of hourly reve-
nues minus the costs connected with commitment:
∑
∈
−
H h
h h v S v π P = Φ ) ( ) (. ( 6 )
In (6) a utilized generator always gets an optimal profit  ) ( h π P  from (5), which is
not necessarily positive (see Fig. 2). The market price could be lower than the variable
costs, but for a generator with commitment constraints it could still be profitable to
stay online. Given a vector of hourly prices π, a generator should use the optimal
commitment schedule, maximizing (6). When the optimal commitment schedule, de-
noted here by the vector v ˆ , yields less profit than the operational commitment sched-
ule v* determined by the market operator, then the need for commitment compensa-
tion R
c appears:
) *, ( ) , ˆ ( π v Φ π v Φ = R
c − .( 7 )
The compensation R
c may act as a nonnegative reward, given to a generator that
conforms to the pool operational schedule.
To determine R
c and the prices under such an optimization model, it is necessary to
derive the price dependent function  ) , ˆ ( π v Φ . One such way is to use forward dynamic
programming to determine a generator’s optimal profit [14]. The Bellman inductive
function  ) ( 1 1 + h + h v ω  denoting the optimum profits from hour 0 to h + 1 for an operat-
ing generator that is in state  1 + h v at hour h + 1 is given by:
)} , ( ) ( { max ) ( ) ( 1 } 1 / 0 { 1 1 1 1 + h h h h v + h + h + h + h v v S v ω + v π P = v ω
h − ∈ . (8)
The total maximum profit  ) , ˆ ( π v Φ  is obtained in one of the states “on” or “off” in
the last hour |H| (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Idea of the method of determining a unit’s
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Then, we can rewrite (7) as:
}. 1 / 0 { for ) *, ( ) ( ∈ − ≥ | H | | H | | H |
c v π v Φ v ω R (9)
Proper representation of the inductive profit functions ω requires the introduction
of binary variables into the pricing model. For details of complete MILP prices and
the formulation of a compensation optimization model, the interested reader is referred
to [14].
4. Specifications of pool based auction bids
To cope with specific market requirements, some market designers have estab-
lished alternative rules that can be imposed on market participants with some degree
of arbitrariness and equity. Usually, pool auctions enable generating units to adapt
their bidding strategies to capacity constraints and production characteristics: up and
down ramp constraints, minimum start-up and minimum shut-down commitment con-
straints, fixed costs, etc. [1].
Our pricing model can be applied to a number of energy auctions dealing with
non-convex bids, as long as they are commitment dependent, as we state in (6) or (8).
To be more specific, we show how to model  ) , ( 1 + h h v v S  in (8) to address specific state
and inter-state dependent costs:
1) Start-up costs. As we have already shown in [14], start-up costs S
u can be in-
cluded in (8) as:
1 1 ) 1 ( ) , ( + h h
u
+ h h v v S = v v S − . (10)
An illustration is given in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Inclusion of start-up costs in DP schema
2) Shut-down costs. These costs are ignored in most papers, as the inclusion of
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from complicating the formulation. Shut-down costs S
d can be modeled analogously to
start-up costs:
) 1 ( ) , ( 1 1 + h h
d
+ h h v v S = v v S − . (11)
An illustration is given in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Inclusion of shut down costs in DP schema
3) Fixed costs. Fixed costs that appear in operational hours are the simplest bid
components that bring non-convexities into the market. Bids with fixed-costs have
been studied, for example, in [9] and in [5]. In our model, fixed costs S
f can be simply
represented by:
1 1) ( + h
f
+ h h v S = v , v S . (12)
An illustration is given in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Inclusion of fixed costs in DP schema
Example. Let us consider the example introduced in [5], based on the case studied in
[9]. There are two units each with two generators, each generator having different vari-
able generation costs for producing up to 100 MW each. These costs are $ 65/MWh and
$ 110/MWh respectively for unit A, $ 40/MWh and $ 90/MWh for unit B. Furthermore,
unit B has fixed commitment costs equal to $ 6000/h. Problems with pricing appear for
a load that is more than 100 MW and less than 300 MW. With such loads the more ex-
pensive generator of unit B is utilized, while unit A is off, or partially utilized. Thus,
there are no fair uniform prices that support such an operational schedule. Based on the
example studied in [5], we report a comparison of the compensation payments obtainedI. ŻÓŁTOWSKA, E. TOCZYŁOWSKI 134
by applying three pricing models – the restricted model “U r” proposed in [9], the model
used by New York’s Independent System Operator “U d” and the convex hull model
“U h” proposed in [5]. The first model sometimes gives lower and sometimes lower
compensation payments than the second model, but the last method always gives the
lowest compensation payments – see Fig. 7. Applying this one-period example to our
pricing model gives exactly the same results as using the third model, the lowest com-
pensation costs and consumer payments. However, the model proposed in [5] requires
the use of the Lagrangian Relaxation method for the more general multi-period case,
while our model can be solved exactly by using a commercial solver (Cplex). Further-
more, none of the previous methods deal with elastic demand.
Fig. 7. Comparison of example uplift (compensation) costs.
U r – restricted model [10], U d – model of New York ISO, U h – convex hull model [5].
The results of our model are the same as those of U h.
Source [5]
4)  Capacity constraints. Constraints on the minimum generation capacity also
bring non-convexities into the auction, but they only affect the hourly revenue func-
tion (2), and together with that the price dependent profit function  ) (π P . In a market
with only capacity constraints, a simple LP pricing model without commitment com-
pensation may be applied.
5) Start-up and shut-down time characteristics. The inclusion of a start-up time T
u
and shut-down time T
d involves the formulation of the recursive function  ) ( 1 1 + h + h v ω
given by (8), see Fig. 8.
The transition to a given commitment state  1 + h v  can be performed without delay
only from the same commitment state, whereas the transition from the other state re-A compensation-based pricing scheme in markets with non-convexities 135
quires T
u or T
d hours, depending on the state  1 + h v . Then, instead of by (8), the recur-
sive function ω determining the optimal profit at hour h + 1 is:
), ( { max ) ( ) ( } 1 / 0 { 1 1 1 1 h h v + h + h + h + h v ω + v π P = v ω
h∈
)} 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 + h
d
+ h
u
+ h + h
d
+ h u T h v S v S v v T v ω − − − − −
−   (13)
Fig. 8. Inclusion of start up and shut down time in the DP schema
The formulation in (13) gives a general idea of how ω is determined when the
time characteristics are considered. To model all dependencies, one should investi-
gate both the beginning and end of a planning horizon, where start-ups and shut-
downs are not considered. This would bring no significant contribution, but would
lead to more complicated notation.
Furthermore, the pricing scheme considered can be easily extended to include con-
straints imposed by the transmission network. In [15] we explain how such a mecha-
nism can determine compensation and hourly selling and purchase prices 
B
nh
S
nh π π ,
at a network node n. Differences in purchase and selling prices at the nodes enable
covering the costs of the necessary compensation paid to the participants whose
optimal unconstrained schedules are incompatible with the operational schedules.
Differences in nodal selling prices enable covering the congestion costs.
5. Power exchange with non-convex bids
Pool-based auctions do not exhaust all the possibilities of non-convex market.
Some market rules other than centralized unit commitment frameworks can also help
the participants to satisfy their non-convex operational constraints. For example, as in
the Amsterdam Power Exchange, market participants are allowed to use block bids to
specify their requirements for a minimum income (maximum payments) [10].I. ŻÓŁTOWSKA, E. TOCZYŁOWSKI 136
A block bid is a bid for which participants offer to buy or sell the same quantity of
energy Q, for a given period of T consecutive hours at a minimum unit price b for
sales (maximum price for purchases). An illustration is given in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9. An example of a block bid
The approach of using block bids to take non-convexities into account in an
auction enables simplifying the interpretation of R
c  compensation given in (7).
Compensation R
c is paid only for block bids (other bids can only receive dispatch
compensation) when non-competitive pricing exists. The market operator decides
whether a block bid is accepted or rejected. This is indicated using a binary variable z.
The revenue from a block bid is the sum of hourly revenues in the given time pe-
riod T:
∑
∈
−
T h
h Q b π z = z Φ ) ( ) ( . (14)
Given the price π, the generator should attempt to achieve the optimal acceptance
decision  z ˆ , maximizing (14). When the optimal decision  z ˆ  yields lower profit than
the operational decision z*, then theneed for compensation R
c appears:
) ( ) 1 ( ∗ − ∗ − ≥ z Φ z Φ R
c . (15)
In the case of an exchange market with a minimum profit condition, the prices and
compensation payments can be computed using a simple LP compensation minimizing
model.
It should be noted that the conditions for assigning compensation to block bids dif-
fer from those postulated in [10]. Here, all block bids, both accepted and rejected,
obtain the optimal profits under market prices. In [10] the authors suggest that rejected
bids should get confiscatory prices d to inform the bidder of the minimum amount that
the bid would need to be changed by to be accepted. If such a market rule is desired,
then (15) should be rewritten as:
) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ∗ − − ∗ − ∗ − ≥ z d z Φ z Φ R
c . (16)A compensation-based pricing scheme in markets with non-convexities 137
As the nonnegative price d does not play a role in redistributing the surplus among
the market participants, it should be included in the objective function defining the
compensation to be minimized (1).
Table 1. Example of a two period block bid.
Source [10]
Bid Period 1 Period 2
Price Quantity Price Quantity
1 70 100
2 –5 125* –5 125*
3 –10 60
4 –30 100* –30 100*
5 –40 70 –40 160
6 90 150
The operational schedule maximizing social welfare is given in Table 2.
Table 2. Optimal schedule for two period block bid.
Source [10]
Bid Period 1 Period 2
Price Quantity Price Quantity
1 70 100
2 –5 0 –5 0
3 –10 0
4 –30 100* –30 100*
5 –40 0 –40 50
6 90 150
Table 3. Comparison of the prices obtained under the model described in [10]
and the one discussed in this paper
Model [10]
– solution
Model [10]
– alternative solution
Model discussed
in this paper
Purchase
price
Selling
price
Purchase
price
Selling
price
Purchase
price
Selling
price
Period 1 10+4.4445 10 10+10 10 20 10
Period 2 40+3.7 40 40 40 40 40
Block bid 4 is accepted, while the cheapest block bid, 2, is rejected, as it is not fea-
sible in period 1 (the demand is less than the quantity offered by Bid 2). On the other
hand, Bid 3 with price 10 is rejected as it offers too small a quantity of energy. TheI. ŻÓŁTOWSKA, E. TOCZYŁOWSKI 138
payments determined under the multi-part prices proposed in [10] yield exactly the
same results as our pricing scheme, i.e. consumer payments are equal to 8000 and
compensation costs are equal to 1000 (see Table 3). We reproduce two equivalent
solutions to the example given in [10] (the second one gives the same prices as ours),
but generally there is a continuum of potential prices that may clear the market. Nev-
ertheless, they will always give the same total payments and compensation.
The compensation paid to Bid 4 is 1000 for both approaches (under the assumption
that the disincentive price is sent to Bid 2). The solution and degree of freedom in
pricing are the same for both approaches. However, it is not explained in [10] how the
proposed model could be extended to consider, for example, start-up costs. Our pric-
ing scheme, as shown in this simple example, has no limitations to including further
constraints.
6. Summary and future research
We have analyzed a pricing model that computes the minimum compensation re-
quired to provide the participants of non-convex markets with fair revenues. We have
described extensions of the basic model to cope with various non-linear costs and con-
straints, as well as several forms of bids. Using simple examples found in the very
recent and relevant literature, we have illustrated the desirable properties of our com-
pensation based pricing scheme in comparison to other methods. We have given some
guidelines on how to use the considered pricing model in various pool-like multi-
period markets.
Within the framework of centralized auctions, there may be many exact or near-
optimal solutions. For example, if Lagrangean relaxation is used, it may result in
similar commitments or MIP near-optimal solutions [5], [12]. However, small varia-
tions in near-optimal commitments could yield significantly different payoffs to the
market participants. This issue is comprehensively studied in [12].
The pricing model considered here may serve as a mechanism for prices that can
support operational solutions and is applied as a separate step of the market clearing
procedure, after solving the unit commitment problem. Examination of the economic
properties of this pricing model should be addressed further using a number of tests,
but the preliminary analysis of some case studies has produced promising results with
a highly reduced profit volatility.
The future line of research should also include an analysis of incentive compatibil-
ity. The main need for complex auctions is to design fair pricing rules that would give
incentives to the marginal participants to reveal their true costs. This requires broad-
ening the theory on strategic behavior for complex auctions.A compensation-based pricing scheme in markets with non-convexities 139
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Mechanizm rozliczeń oparty na rekompensatach
do zastosowania na rynkach z ofertami nieliniowymi
Rozważany w pracy model rozliczania obrotu oparty na rekompensatach jest odpowiednim narzę-
dziem wyceny na rynkach giełdowych w sytuacji, gdy nie można wyznaczyć jednolitych cen równowagi.
Sytuacja taka ma miejsce np. na bilansującym rynku energii elektrycznej, gdy w procesie bilansowania
rynku są uwzględniane indywidualne ograniczenia i nieliniowe koszty jednostek wytwórczych. W pracy
rozważono model wyceny opracowany przez autorów w [14], analizując jego właściwości istotne z per-
spektywy projektowania mechanizmów rynkowych (indywidualna racjonalność, neutralność finansowa,
efektywność). W głównej części pracy przedstawiono szersze zastosowania modelu do różnych typów
ofert (schodkowe, przedziałami liniowe) oraz wprowadzanych ograniczeń (czasy rozruchu i odstawienia,
koszty rozruchu i odstawienia, koszty stałe). Ważnym obszarem zastosowań mechanizmu mogą być
również giełdy energii dopuszczające składanie ofert blokowych. Pokazano schematy modelowania
zadania rozliczania obrotu w postaci zadania MILP dla różnych typów rynków. Poszczególne mozliwośći
zastosowania zilustrowano na przykładach. W podsumowaniu zaprezentowano dalsze kierunki rozwoju
badań nad modelami wyceny na rynkach z ograniczeniami.
Słowa kluczowe: projektowanie aukcji, rynek energii elektrycznej, oferty nieliniowe, ograniczenia jednostek
cieplnych